Intel Wars Read online

  47 “According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records” The FBI aviation front companies are Northeast Aircraft Leasing Corp., Northwest Aircraft Leasing Corp., Southeast Aircraft Leasing Corp., Southwest Aircraft Leasing Corp., National Aircraft Leasing Corp., and Worldwide Aircraft Leasing Corp.

  48 “Unlike its larger cousins” National Reconnaissance Office, Mission Ground Station Declassification Questions and Answers, October 15, 2008, NRO FOIA via Dr. Jeffrey T. Richelson. Top Secret.

  48 “As it was during the Cold War” Cable, Kyiv 001942, AMEMBASSY KYIV to SECSTATE WASH DC, “U.S.-Ukraine Nonproliferation Meetings September 23–24, 2009,” December 24, 2009, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret/NOFORN.

  49 “NSA was a shambles” Memorandum, The Threats and Opportunities: 9/11, al Qa’ida and Other 21st Century Challenges, undated, p. 4, Records of the 9/11 Commission, NARA, Washington, D.C., Unclassified; Memorandum for the Record, Interview with Rich Taylor, Former NSA Deputy Director for Operations, 1997–2001, December 10, 2003, p. 6, Records of the 9/11 Commission, NARA, Washington, D.C. Top Secret COMINT.

  49 “According to General Montgomery Meigs” Memorandum, Meigs to Secretary of Defense, Answers to SecDef “23 Questions,” July 28, 2001, DOD FOIA. Secret/Close Hold/NOFORN.

  50 “In 2009, the president of Panama” Cable, Panama 000905, AMEMBASSY PANAMA to SECSTATE WASH DC, “Guidance Request: DEA Wiretap Program,” December 24, 2009, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret/NOFORN.

  51 “27 people, no capability—a total mess” Memorandum for Record, Interview of Patrick M. Hughes, Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis, DHS, April 4, 2004, 9/11 Commission Files, NARA, Washington, D.C. Unclassified.

  51 “The U.S. State Department itself has become” Cable, State 080163, SECSTATE WASH DC to USMISSION UN ROME, “Reporting and Collection Needs: The United Nations,” July 31, 2009, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret/NOFORN.

  52 “As of 2009, the U.S. Army had a staggering 54,000 men and women” U.S. Army, Director of Military Intelligence, PowerPoint Presentation, A Strategy to Rebalance the Army MI Force, December 15, 2009, slide 7. Unclassified.

  53 “But it was the unmanned reconnaissance drone” Unless otherwise noted, all data in this section were derived from Dr. Daniel L. Hauman, U.S. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Combat, 1991–2003 (Bolling AFB: Air Force History Office, June 9, 2003), Unclassified; Headquarters U.S. Air Force, PowerPoint Presentation, Air Force Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) Flight Plan 2009–2047, July 23, 2009, Unclassified; U.S. Army UAS Center of Excellence, Fort Rucker, Alabama, “Eyes of the Army”: U.S. Army Roadmap for Unmanned Aircraft Systems: 2010–2036, April 2010, Unclassified.

  53 “The growth of the military’s drone fleet” As of 9/11, the U.S. Army had only 54 Hunter and Shadow drones in its inventory. Today, the Army has 4,034 drones (42 medium-sized and 3,992 small drones) deployed in the United States and overseas. As of July 2009, the USAF had 158 drones in its inventory (118 Predator, 27 Reaper, and 13 Global Hawk).

  59 “more data than we can translate into useable knowledge” Memorandum, “Visualizing the Intelligence System of 2025,” attached to Memorandum, Rumsfeld to Cambone and Haver, Intelligence System of 2025, June 23, 2001, Rumsfeld.com. Unclassified.

  59 “This is parochialism at its worst.” Colonel Barry Harris, U.S. Army, Intelligence Transition in the United States Army: Are We on the Right Path? (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, August 2009), p. 27. Unclassified.

  59 “a hysterical group of Talmudic scholars” Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, vol. 7, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2010), p. 466.

  60 “According to a restricted-access Pentagon briefing” Colonel Jack Jones, Military Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, PowerPoint Presentation, ISR Trends & Challenges, undated but circa 2010. FOUO.

  60 “Information is like confetti” Brigadier General Michael Shields, Director, National Joint Operations and Intelligence Center (NJOIC), PowerPoint Presentation, NJOIC Collaboration and Web 2.0, April 22, 2010. Unclassified.

  60 “fundamentally unreformed” Patrick C. Neary, “Intelligence Reform, 2001–2009: Requiescat in Pace?” Studies in Intelligence, vol. 54, no. 1, March 2010.

  61 “be a train wreck” Memorandum, Rumsfeld to President, Intelligence “Reform,” September 11, 2004, Rumsfeld.com. Unclassified.

  61 “looked at the reform brouhaha with detached bemusement” Patrick C. Neary, “Intelligence Reform, 2001–2009: Requiescat in Pace?” Studies in Intelligence, vol. 54, no. 1, March 2010.

  62 “This reality was summarized succinctly” Draft Study, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Study of the Mission, Size, and Function of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, March 2010. Secret.

  63 “undermining ODNI’s credibility” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Office of the Inspector General, Critical Intelligence Community Management Challenges, November 12, 2008. Unclassified.

  63 “According to Patrick G. Eddington” Patrick G. Eddington, Long Strange Journey: An Intelligence Memoir (Shelbyville, Kentucky: Wasteland Press, 2011), p. 17.

  63 “received a lot of resistance from [within] the FBI” Memorandum for Record, Interview of Admiral David Jeremiah, USN (ret.), October 22, 2003, 9/11 Commission Files, NARA, Washington, D.C. Top Secret Codeword.

  63 “doubts whether the FBI can carry out reform” Memorandum for Record, Meeting of Vice Chair Hamilton with SSCI Vice Chair Jay Rockefeller, October 16, 2003, 9/11 Commission Files, NARA, Washington, D.C. Unclassified.

  64 “Take the example of Thomas A. Drake” Indictment, United States of America v. Thomas Andrews Drake, April 14, 2010, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Maryland. Unclassified.

  64 “On June 9, 2011” DOD, Office of the Inspector General, Requirements for the TRAILBLAZER and THINTHREAD Systems, December 15, 2004, p. 27. Top Secret/COMINT.

  65 “a culture that is emphatic about secrecy” Major General Michael T. Flynn, USA, Captain Matt Pottinger, USMC, and Paul D. Batchelor, DIA, Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan (Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security, January 2010), p. 9.

  67 “For example, the U.S. Air Force had 34 Predator drones” Brigadier General Walt Davis, USA, Director of Army Aviation, PowerPoint Presentation, Army Aviation, January 13, 2009. FOUO.

  67 “We also spent a lot of time, money, blood, and treasure” Russell W. Glenn and S. Jamie Gayton, Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, November 2008), p. 194. FOUO.

  68 “the results of such missions were “lackluster” at best” Captain Kyle Greenberg, “Unmanned Aerial Systems: Quality as Well as Quantity,” Military Review, July–August 2010, p. 53.

  68 “a minimum of 72 hours” U.S. Army, Operation Enduring Freedom: Combat Aviation Brigade in Afghanistan Initial Impressions Report, November 2008. Unclassified/FOUO.

  68 “Over 90% [of all detainees were] released due to insufficient evidence” U.S. Marine Corps, PowerPoint Presentation, Military Police Support of the MAGTF: Case Study: 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit Operation Azada Wosa, Afghanistan 2008, November 2008. FOUO.

  69 All the information we need is available in ISAF.” Brigadier General Michael Shields, Director, National Joint Operations and Intelligence Center (NJOIC), PowerPoint Presentation, NJOIC Collaboration and Web 2.0, April 22, 2010. Unclassified.

  3: THE SWORD OF DAMOCLES

  70 “He was referring to the Soviet military’s disastrous” G. F. Krivosheev, Grif sekretnosti snyat [The Secret Seal Is Removed] (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1993), pp. 401–5.

  71 “The decision [to invade Afghanistan]” CC CPSU Letter on Afghanistan, May 10, 1988, in Svetlana Savranskaya, ed., Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last War: The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan: Russian Documents and Memoirs, October 9, 2001, National Securit
y Archive Electronic Briefing Book 57, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/soviet.html

  72 “In June 2006, the top Pentagon official” Memorandum, Vickers to President, Transitioning to an Indirect Approach in Iraq, June 12, 2006, Rumsfeld.com. Unclassified.

  73 “many indicators suggest the overall situation” Memorandum, Headquarters, NATO International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan (ISAF) to Secretary of Defense, Commander’s Initial Assessment, August 30, 2009, p. 2-1. Confidential.

  75 “I don’t want to say we’re clueless, but we are.” Major General Michael T. Flynn, USA, Captain Matt Pottinger, USMC, and Paul D. Batchelor, DIA, Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan (Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security, January 2010), p. 9.

  77 “The embassy of virtually every major foreign power in Kabul” ISAF CJ2, Threat Report Other Rpt Kabul, August 25, 2007, WikiLeaks Kabul War Diary Files. Secret.

  78 “The CTPT teams, which are deployed at twenty-six firebases” The largest CTPT teams are based at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Asadabad in Kunar Province, Camp Dyer outside the city of Jalalabad in Nangarhar Province, FOB Salerno and FOB Chapman outside the city of Khost in Khost Province, FOB Lilley and FOB Orgun-e in Paktika Province, Spin Boldak in Kandahar Province, and FOB Geckho in central Helmand Province. There is also a CTPT Quick Reaction Force at Bagram Air Base that can be rapidly sent by helicopter anywhere in eastern Afghanistan at short notice.

  79 “like the small agency-run listening post called Cardinal” Report, 231200Z TF Rock Conducts Boarder Flag Meeting IVO Ghaki Pass, June 23, 2007, WikiLeaks Kabul War Diary Files. Secret.

  86 “We now knew where all of the males in the village were” Personal Experiences Paper of Dwight C. Utley, SGM, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, Konar Valley, Afghanistan, May 15–December 1, 2004, Combat Studies Institute, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, August 20, 2006, p. 10. Unclassified.

  86 “The people here have an incestuous relationship with the Taliban” “Facilitating Development and Governance in Kunar Province,” Army, May 2010, p. 66.

  88 “On September 8, 2009, several hundred Taliban guerrillas” A sanitized version of the army’s postmortem investigation into the attack on COP Keating can be found in HQ, Combined/Joint Task Force (CJTF)-82, Memorandum for Record, AR 15-6 Report of Investigation into Operations in the Gangjal Valley, Konar Province, Afghanistan, 8 September 2009 (Executive Summary), November 25, 2009, ISAF FOIA. Secret.

  88 “On October 24, 2009, the Wall Street Journal reported” Yochi J. Dreazen and Anand Gopal, “In One Province, Taliban Revive,” Wall Street Journal, October 24, 2009.

  89 “Since 2006, more Taliban attacks have occurred in Helmand” NATO, International Security Assistance Force, Metrics Brief 2007–2008, February 2009. FOUO.

  90 “with a declassified Marine Corps report admitting” U.S. Marine Corps, PowerPoint Presentation, 2nd Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment OEF First 100 Days After Action Review, November 2009. FOUO.

  90 “complete lack of security in the provincial capital” Cable, Kabul 001677, AMEMBASSY KABUL to SECSTATE WASH DC, “Helmand Governor Mangal Upbeat, Hopeful in Meeting with Ambassador,” June 27, 2009, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Confidential.

  90 “almost all officials [in Helmand Province] are assessed to be in some way involved in” Elizabeth Lee Walker, ISAF Rule of Law adviser, Culturally-Attuned Government and Justice in Helmand Province, Afghanistan (Washington, D.C.: International Media Ventures, April 2010), p. 5. FOUO.

  91 “When they got into the area that Daud controlled” Oral History, Interview with Lt. Colonel Michael Slusher, Combat Studies Institute, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, February 16, 2007, p. 15. Unclassified.

  91 “It was hard to determine if folks were actually no-joke Taliban or just criminals” Oral History, Interview with Major Stuart Farris, Combat Studies Institute, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, December 6, 2007, p. 7. Unclassified.

  94 “little was known by ISAF about the human terrain and insurgent dispositions in Marjah” Theo Farrell, Briefing Note, Appraising Moshtarak: The Campaign in Nad-e-Ali District, Helmand (London: Royal United Services Institute, June 23, 2010), p. 2. Unclassified.

  95 “Karzai doesn’t get it” Cable, Kabul 000693, AMEMBASSY KABUL to SECSTATE WASH DC, “Ahmed Wali Karzai: Seeking to Define Himself as U.S. Partner?” February 25, 2010, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret.

  96 “demonstrates the fragility of European support for the NATO-led ISAF mission” CIA Red Cell, Special Memorandum, Afghanistan: Sustaining West European Support for the NATO-led Mission—Why Counting on Apathy Might Not Be Enough, March 11, 2010. Confidential/NOFORN.

  96 “The situation on the ground was increasingly grim” International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan (ISAF), PowerPoint Presentation, ISAF Joint Command District Assessments, April 8, 2010. NATO/ISAF Unclassified REL GIROA.

  96 “there are growing fissures between [the Taliban] groups” Major General Bill Mayville, USA, “Ops Update: The State of the Insurgency,” The Afghan Hands Blog, March 17, 2010, http://www.isaf.nato.int. Unclassified.

  97 “Even the Pentagon’s April 2010 assessment” Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces, April 2010, p. 34. Unclassified.

  4: THE ROOT OF ALL EVIL

  100 “Pakistan’s intermittent support to terrorist groups and militant organizations threatens to undermine” Cable, State 131801, SECSTATE WASH DC to AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI et al., “Terrorist Finance: Action Request for Senior Level Engagement on Terrorism Finance,” December 30, 2009, WikiLeaks Cablegate Files. Secret/NOFORN.

  102 “According to author Bob Woodward” Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010), p. 3.

  102 “the lawless 10,000-square-mile area of northern Pakistan bordering Afghanistan called the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, or FATA” The FATA is an amalgamation of seven tribal agencies (Khyber, Kurram, Bajaur, Mohmand, Orakzai, North Waziristan and South Waziristan) and six frontier regions (Peshawar, Kohat, Tank, Banuu, Lakki, and Dera Ismail Khan). The FATA has a population of approximately 4 million people, almost all of whom are ethnic Pashtuns who make no secret of their sympathy for their Afghan Taliban brethren.

  103 “I fear we are so mesmerized [by signals intelligence] that we find it impossible” Memorandum, Wolfowitz to Rumsfeld, Al Qaeda Ops Sec. July 19, 2002, DOD FOIA. Secret.

  103 “looking for a silver needle in a stack of 6 million needles.” Colonel Jasey Briley, U.S. Army Intelligence Center & Fort Huachuca, PowerPoint Presentation to the 2009 Fires Symposium, Army Intelligence in an Age of Uncertainty, March 18, 2009. Unclassified.

  104 “some terrorist groups use family and communal relationships” Memorandum, “Visualizing the Intelligence System of 2025,” attached to Memorandum, Rumsfeld to Cambone and Haver, Intelligence System of 2025, June 23, 2001, Rumsfeld.com. Unclassified.

  104 “screen their recruits probably better than the U.S. government does” Michael J. Sulick, Human Intelligence, March 22, 2007, p. 8, Seminar on Intelligence, Command and Control, Center for Information Policy Research, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

  105 “Over the next four years (2004–8), CIA Predator drones conducted 46 missile strikes” A breakdown of these CIA drone attacks is as follows: 2004: 1 strike; 2005: 1 strike; 2006: 3 strikes; 2007: 5 strikes; 2008: 36 strikes. Bill Roggio and Alexander Mayer, “Analysis: A Look at US Airstrikes in Pakistan Through September 2009,” The Long War Journal, October 1, 2009.

  106 “Senior Pakistani military officials asked for access” See, for example, Report, 260000Z CJTF82 CJ3 KLE PAK Military 11th Corps Cdr & 7th Div Cdr, March 26, 2007, WikiLeaks Kabul War Diary Files. Secret.

  107 “they are going to cooperate [with the CIA] to the least extent that they can get away with” Michael J. Sulick, Human Intelligence, March 22, 2007, p. 15, Seminar on Intelligence, Command an
d Control, Center for Information Policy Research, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

  108 “al Qaeda had succeeded in regenerating itself in the sanctuaries afforded it in northern Pakistan” Director of National Intelligence, National Intelligence Council, National Intelligence Estimate, The Terrorist Threat to the Homeland, July 2007, Unclassified.

  110 “by the time I left office (in January 2009), more than a dozen of those people [on the list] were dead” Mark Mansfield, “Reflections on Service: A Conversation with Former CIA Director Michael Hayden,” Studies in Intelligence, vol. 54, no. 2, June 2010.

  110 “shortly before dawn on the morning of September 3, 2008” This was the second known U.S. commando raid into Pakistan. Two years earlier, in March 2006, a forty-man U.S. special operation team was dropped inside Pakistan and attacked an al Qaeda camp near the town of Danda Saidgai in North Waziristan, killing Imam Asad, the Chechen commander of the Black Guard, the elite praetorian guard for Osama bin Laden and other senior al Qaeda leaders. A third cross-border commando raid by U.S. Navy SEALs in 2005, whose goal was to kill Osama bin Laden’s deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, according to newspaper reports was called off at the last moment by the Pentagon.

  111 “may still enjoy support from the lower echelons of the ISI.” Department of State, Issue Paper for Vice President, Counterterrorism Activities (Neo-Taliban), December 9, 2005, State Department FOIA. Secret. On file at the National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.

  111 “Pakistani Intelligence Service (ISI) elements have an ongoing relationship with the Taliban.” Joint Chiefs of Staff, PowerPoint Presentation, Strategy for the Long War: 2006–2016, various dates between September 27, 2006, and November 3, 2006, p. 25, DOD FOIA. Secret.

  111 “The consensus opinion within the intelligence community at the time was” U.S. Army, TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA), HB 9 Paramilitary Terrorist Insurgent Groups: Afghanistan, March 1, 2009. FOUO.